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FOREWORD
The forces of globalization present challenges, risks,
and opportunities to virtually every industry in every
country. This includes the sector that traditionally has
been more insulated from external pressures than any
other—the defense industrial base. One of the most
important implications of globalization is its effect
on the economic competitiveness of countries and
particular industries. Both governments and defense
companies bear the responsibility for devising prudent
policies and strategies that capture the opportunities
presented by globalization, while mitigating the risks.
In this monograph, Dr. Terrence Guay explores how
key elements of globalization have transformed national
defense industries around the world, and how these
changes will affect the U.S. defense industrial base in the
coming years. He focuses on elements of globalization
that are relevant especially to the defense industry:
the globalization of capital (finance), production,
trade, technology and labor; and the changes in global
governance that structure the forces of globalization.
He concludes by offering ten recommendations for
policymakers who have the difficult task of maximizing
U.S. economic competitiveness without compromising
national security.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish
this work as part of our External Research Associates
Program.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph examines the impact of
globalization on the U.S. defense industrial base. After
providing a brief overview of globalization’s general
effects on countries and companies and the current
structure of the global defense industry, the author
examines how elements of globalization are shaping
the strategies of defense companies. He focuses on
those elements of globalization that are of particular
importance to the defense industry. They include the
globalization of capital (finance), production, trade,
technology and labor, and the changes in global
governance that structure the forces of globalization.
The author concludes by offering 10 recommendations
on how U.S. Government, military, and companylevel policies can preserve the U.S. defense industrial
base during the current era of globalization. The
recommendations revolve around three themes:
1) Globalization is blurring the distinction between a
domestic and foreign defense company, and policies
that aim to keep this artificial distinction are not helping
either national security or the defense industrial base;
2) workers are a defense company’s most important
asset, and policies should be designed to have the best
educated and trained workers designing and building
U.S. weapons systems; and, 3) the relationship between
globalization and technology provides both risks and
opportunities, and policies geared toward preserving a
perceived U.S. advantage in technology may prove to
be detrimental to both national security and economic
competitiveness.



GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
INTRODUCTION
“Globalization” is perhaps the most popular
term used to describe changes in the international
environment since the end of the Cold War.
Unfortunately, the term now is used so frequently
that it has come to mean different things to different
people. This lack of a precise definition of a term
with wide currency can make it difficult to discuss
globalization’s effects in a coherent way. However, one
useful working definition of “globalization” proposed
by the International Monetary Fund is “the growing
economic interdependence of countries world-wide
through the increasing volume and variety of crossborder transactions in goods and services and of
international capital flows, and also through the more
rapid and widespread diffusion of technology.”1 While
economics and technology are perhaps its most tangible
characteristics, globalization also includes political,
cultural, and ideational dimensions, since each of
these has a reciprocal relationship with economic and
technological change. This combination of forces will
present challenges, risks, and opportunities to virtually
every industry in every country for the foreseeable
future. This includes the sector that traditionally has
been more insulated from external pressures than any
other—the defense industrial base. This monograph
will explore how key elements of globalization have
transformed national defense industries around the
world, and how these changes will affect the U.S.
defense industrial base in the coming years. It concludes



by offering recommendations for policymakers who
have the difficult task of maximizing U.S. economic
competitiveness without compromising national
security. The recommendations revolve around three
themes: 1) Globalization is blurring the distinction
between a domestic and foreign defense company,
and policies that aim to keep this artificial distinction
are not helping either national security or the defense
industrial base; 2) workers are a defense company’s
most important asset, and policies should be designed
to have the best educated and trained workers
designing and building U.S. weapons systems; and 3)
the relationship between globalization and technology
provides both risks and opportunities, and policies
geared toward preserving a perceived U.S. advantage
in technology may prove to be detrimental to both
national security and economic competitiveness.
GLOBALIZATION
Although some would argue that features of
globalization like cross-border trade and investment
have been present for centuries, the proliferation of
publications on globalization—both scholarly and
mass market—dates to the end of the Cold War. The
collapse of the bipolar international system, shaped
for almost half a century by political forces, presented
opportunities for numerous alternative explanations
of how a post-Cold War world would be shaped.
Francis Fukuyama suggested in The End of History and
the Last Man that the ideas of political liberalism and
democracy would dominate international political
discourse and spread to authoritarian states.2 Samuel
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations presented a darker
image of the world dividing among fault lines based



on cultural, religious, and historical ties, ultimately
leading to conflict between these groups.3 But it was
the economic dimension that seemed to best capture
global change in the 1990s. In part, it described the
attempts by formerly communist countries in Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union, and especially China
to transition to capitalist forms of economic systems.
In part, it represented the increasing prominence of
international organizations. The European Community
(now European Union, or EU) made “EC-1992” a
buzzword in many corporate suites and government
offices around the world, as business executives and
policymakers planned their strategies for the challenges
posed by European economic integration, including
the creation of a new currency—the Euro. The 1990s
saw the rise of other regional groups including the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
Mercosur in South America. Also during this period,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
was transformed into the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Covering a wider range of goods and services
and with more authority to punish countries in
violation of international trade rules, the WTO helped
to accelerate international trade, while at the same
time serving as a focal point for those groups opposed
to both the organization’s mission and regulatory
powers.
But the economic dimension of globalization perhaps is symbolized best by the expansion of production,
investment, and sales by multinational corporations
into other countries. According to the WTO, world
merchandise exports doubled from $1.8 trillion in 1983
to $3.7 trillion in 1993, doubling again to $7.4 trillion in
2003, and rising to $10.2 trillion in 2005.4 Meanwhile,
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and



Development (OECD), whose members consist of
the world’s 30 most prominent market democracies,
reports that the total stock of inward investment
among its members rose from $1.3 trillion in 1990 to
$7.3 trillion in 2004.5 It even has became popular to
rank the sales of multinational corporations with the
gross domestic product (GDP) of countries, apparently
(and in many ways misleadingly) suggesting that large
companies were more powerful than many countries.
For example, Lockheed Martin’s 2005 defense revenues
of $36.4 billion were similar in magnitude to Ecuador’s
$36.2 billion GDP. However, such comparisons tell us
very little about the real influence of companies or their
extent of internationalization.
These views of globalization—cultural, political,
religious, and economic—are not mutually exclusive.
In Jihad vs. McWorld, Lionel Barber argued economic
globalization and religious and tribal fundamentalism
had become the two dominant forces in global affairs.6
The homogenizing effects of capitalism, along with
the fragmenting forces of ethnic, religious, and racial
hatreds, were having the effect of undermining the
nation-state and democracy. In The Lexus and the Olive
Tree, Thomas Friedman tried to explain why some
people around the world are embracing the economic
benefits of globalization, particularly increasing
consumerism, while others are threatened by the
negative dimensions of the process, including its effects
on the environment and local communities.7
For the purposes of this monograph, the most
important implication of globalization is its effect on the
economic competitiveness of countries and particular
industries. Globalization’s impact on the defense
industry will be addressed in subsequent sections.
However, there is an abundant literature aimed at



advising business and government decisionmakers
how to capitalize on the globalization process. In The
Work of Nations, former U.S. Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich argued that, in an era where companies are no
longer as committed to their home country, public
policies need to focus on enhancing education, skills,
and training in an effort to make their country an
attractive location for investment by either domestic or
foreign companies.8 Management consultant Kenichi
Ohmae contended that the forces of globalization were
making it less useful to talk about national economies,
and that the rise of industrial clusters would make
regional economies a more accurate tool for mapping
global economic development.9 In his 2005 best-seller,
The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman argues that the
information technology revolution has reduced (perhaps even flattened) the advantages of the industrialized countries.10 An ever-increasing number of bright
and educated workers, particularly in China and India,
require only an internet connection to “plug and play”
in the global economy. The way forward, according to
Friedman, is to equip more Americans with skills that
will keep them ahead of foreign competitors. Business
strategists like Michael Porter contend that countries
still have some key locational advantages, and that
they should build upon these “diamonds” of national
advantage to enhance economic competitiveness.11
Finally, others such as David Baron argue that the rise
of other actors has made it prudent for firms to develop
nonmarket strategies to engage with governments,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international
organizations, and other entities whose actions and
decisions impact companies.12
To summarize, the economic strands of globalization are playing a key role in structuring the global econ-



omy. How companies in the defense industry (and
their home governments) respond to these pressures is
the focus of the remaining sections.
DEFENSE INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
United States.
Historically, the engine of growth for the U.S.
defense industry was strong domestic demand, fueled
by the Cold War. Times were especially prosperous
for the industry from the late 1970s through the late
1980s. By the early 1990s, however, the defense budget
was slashed in search of a “peace dividend,” and
the defense industry realized that the golden years
of President Ronald Reagan’s buildup were over.
Military spending declined from $431 billion in 1990
to $322 billion in 2000 (in constant 2003 dollars), with
the steepest decline coming in the mid-1990s (see Table
1). Prodded in 1993 by then Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin, the industry hastened to adjust.13 Layoffs by
firms such as Northrop, Hughes, Lockheed, General
Dynamics, Litton Industries, and TRW marked a spate
of “downsizings” and acquisitions, culminating in the
mergers of Lockheed and Martin Marietta, Northrop
and Grumman, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, and
Raytheon and Hughes. A 2003 Pentagon report found
that the 50 largest defense suppliers of the early 1980s
had since become the country’s top five contractors.14



1990
United
States

Percent
Change
from
1990

1995

$431,282 $336,635

Percent
Change
from 1990

2000

-21.9% $322,309

Percent
Change
from 1990

2005

-25.3% $478,177

10.9%

France

50,040

46,089

-7.9%

43,796

-12.5%

46,150

-7.8%

Germany

51,180

37,852

-26.0%

36,021

-29.6%

33,187

-35.2%

United
Kingdom

51,479

43,101

-16.3%

40,533

-21.3%

48,305

-6.2%

China

12,3001

14,0001

13.8%

22,2001

80.5%

37,7002

206.5%

India

10,533

10,983

4.3%

15,487

47.0%

20,443

94.0%

Israel

7,677

7,809

1.7%

9,330

21.5%

9,579

24.8%

Japan

37,668

40,483

7.5%

41,755

10.9%

42,081

11.7%

1

1

1

1

-83.4%

-0.2%

Russia

126,400

16,000

-87.3%

14,100

-88.8%

21,000

World

1,003,000

768,000

-23.4%

784,000

-21.8% 1001,000

Figures are in U.S.$ million at constant 2003 prices, and exchange
rates are for calendar year.
1. Estimate.
2. Figure is estimate for 2004.
Source: Figures derived from the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), first.sipri.org/non_first/result_milex.
php and www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_wnr_table.html.

Table 1. Defense Spending of Selected Countries.
U.S. firms now dominate the global defense industry:
Seven of the top ten defense companies in the world
are based in the United States, including Lockheed
Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon,
General Dynamics, and Halliburton (see Table 2). The
U.S. defense industry—or at least the aerospace and
electronics components of it—consolidated quickly,


but with the strong urging of the Pentagon. Most of the
mergers occurred between 1993-98, and allowed firms
to either consolidate existing strengths in the defense
sector or add a business with steadier revenue streams
to complement their civilian side. Boeing’s acquisition of
McDonnell Douglas, for example, helped the company
diversify into the military market. Boeing’s Integrated
Defense Systems business has an order backlog of over
$80 billion, more than any other defense contractor
in the world.15 It has done so not simply by building
military aircraft, but by becoming a prime contractor
delivering integrated battle systems that link together
equipment and systems used by different military
branches.

US world
Rank rank
company
1
1 Lockheed Martin
2
2 Boeing
3
3 Northrop Grumman
4
5 Raytheon
5
6 General Dynamics
6
8 L-3 Communications
7
10 Halliburton1
8
12 United Technologies
9
13 Science Applications
International Corp.2
10
14 General Electric3

2005
defense
revenue1
$36,465
30,791
23,332
18,200
16,570
8,549
7,552
6,832
5,400
3,500

2005
total
revenue1
$37,213
54,845
30,700
21,900
21,244
9,445
20,994
42,700
7,792
149,700

PERCENT of
revenue
from
defense
98
56
76
83
78
91
36
16
69
2

Figures are in U.S.$million.
1. Defense revenue from KBR Federal and Government division.
2. For fiscal year ending 1/31.
3. Defense revenue from GE Aerospace Engines.
Source: Figures derived from Defense News Top 100 (www.
defensenews.com/index.php?S=06top100)

Table 2. Top Ten U.S. Defense Companies (2005).


Since the late 1990s, major defense contractors
have pursued three strategies: buying relatively small
defense units from diversified U.S. conglomerates
(like General Motors and TRW); acquiring defenserelated businesses outside of aerospace and electronics
(such as information technology or shipbuilding); or
expanding abroad by buying foreign defense firms.
The first strategy has been just about exhausted at this
point in time. The second strategy is likely to continue
to be popular, especially in a post-September 11, 2001
(9/11) world where the U.S. Government is spending
considerable sums on homeland security, intelligence,
and surveillance. It is the third strategy that will
present the most interesting possibilities in the nearterm. Larger European or U.S. companies now have
acquired most of the smaller European defense firms.
The next step for U.S. firms in the transatlantic market
would be to acquire or merge with large European
companies—a much more significant development
than the ad hoc alliances and collaborations that often
arise with large multination weapons systems. Since the
obstacles to this strategy are formidable, other options
include acquisitions of and teaming arrangements with
companies outside of the North Atlantic region. While
such companies typically do not have the same level of
technological and production experience as European
ones, other factors (as will be described below) can
make this an attractive option.
Technological change plays an increasingly
critical role in defense industry developments. In the
post-9/11 “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) era, the
U.S. Government is shifting its spending priorities
in ways that emphasize information technology,
intelligence, surveillance, communications, and related
technologies. Since such spending requires high levels



of security, foreign firms—even European ones—
are at a competitive disadvantage for Pentagon and
Homeland Security contracts, even at the subcontractor
level. Some defense firms are making the necessary
changes to fill the needs of anti-terrorism and homeland
security.16 Northrop Grumman expects its sales to the
U.S. Government related to homeland security to be at
least $500 million. The U.S. Department of Homeland
Security has a faster growing budget than the military
defense budget, with investments expected to grow
more than 10 percent each year until 2009. But most
foreign firms will not be trusted to supply these needs.
Still, with a 2007 budget for defense of $439 billion, a
figure larger than the combined total of the world’s
next 20 biggest military spenders, and weapons
procurement of $147 billion, the United States is the
most lucrative market for defense companies—U.S. or
foreign.17
Europe.
The rationalization and restructuring of individual
European defense companies occurred after U.S.
defense industry consolidation. Europe’s defense
industry began the 1990s as a collection of national
defense fiefdoms. While the U.S. defense industry
was consolidating rapidly during the first half of
the decade, most European firms continued to look
inward. Transnational collaborations that did exist
generally took the form of joint ventures (for products
like missiles) or multinational consortia (like the
Eurofighter)—both of which enabled defense firms
to maintain their national independence. Large-scale
cross-border mergers were hindered by the reluctance
of most European governments to see a domestic
company acquired by a foreign firm.
10

By the late 1990s, this situation became untenable.
Given the consolidation in the U.S. defense industry, the
political impetus for a European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP) within the EU, and the fact that other
sectors had begun to consolidate to take advantage of
Europe’s Single Market Program, European defense
firms found themselves under political and economic
pressure to consolidate.18 The first major consolidation
occurred in the United Kingdom (UK) in January 1999,
when GEC agreed to sell its defense arm (Marconi
Electronic Systems) to British Aerospace. The new
entity was renamed BAE Systems (BAE). Nine months
later, the most significant cross-border defense union
to date occurred. The first step, as in the UK, was
national consolidation. As part of its privatization
in June 1999, France’s Aérospatiale joined with
Matra to create an aerospace and defense electronics
powerhouse. Four months later, this combined entity
merged with Dasa to form European Aeronautic
Defence and Space Company (EADS). CASA, Spain’s
leading aerospace and defense firm, also merged into
EADS. BAE now dominates Europe’s defense industry
with 2005 defense revenues of $21.0 billion (79 percent
of BAE’s total revenues), while $9.1 billion (23 percent)
of EADS’s total $40.5 billion total revenue comes from
defense (see Table 3).
Prior to the consolidation of Europe’s aerospace
sector into BAE and EADS, Airbus had operated as a
consortium under which the four partners (Aérospatiale,
Dasa, British Aerospace, and CASA) kept ownership of
their engineering and production assets. As a result of
the consolidation, Airbus became owned by EADS (80
percent) and BAE (20 percent). It is important to keep
in mind that the two companies are involved in both

11

Europe
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

world
rank
4
7
9
11
16
17
19
22
24
27

company
BAE Systems
EADS2
Thales
Finmeccanica
DCN
Rolls Royce
SAFRAN Group3
Dassault Aviation
Saab
QinetiQ4

2005
defense
country revenue1
UK
$20,935
Multiple
9,120
France
8,523
Italy
7,126
France
3,352
UK
3,294
France
3,075
France
2,108
Sweden
1,941
UK
1,677

PERCENT of
revenue
from
2005 total
defense
1
revenue
$26,500
79
40,508
23
12,176
70
12,728
56
3,352
100
11,357
29
12,528
25
4,063
52
2,427
80
1,973
85

1. Figures are in U.S.$ million. Currency conversions calculated
using prevailing rates at the end of each firm’s fiscal year.
2. At the end of 2005, EADS was 29.9% owned by DaimlerChrysler
(Germany), 29.9% by SOGEADE (a French holding company
comprised of Lagardère and the French state), and 5.5% by SEPI
(Spanish state holding company). Approximately 34.8% of EADS
shares were held by the public. In February 2007, EADS ownership
was: DaimlerChrysler (15.07%); consortium of mostly German
banks (7.50%); Lagardère (11.25%); French state (11.25%); SEPI
(5.50%); Russian state-controlled bank Vneshtorgbank (5.40%);
and 44.10% was held by the public. EADS is registered in the
Netherlands.
3. In May 2005 Sagem and Snecma merged to become SAFRAN.
4. Fiscal year ending 3/31. Defense revenue is estimate.
Source: Figures derived from Defense News Top 100 (www.
defensenews.com/index.php?S=06top100).

Table 3. Top 10 European Defense Companies
(2005).
civilian and military business activities, and EADS
and BAE sought ways to bring more defense work into
Airbus. However, BAE appears to want to move into
12

the defense business on its own. The company’s board
of directors recommended in September 2006 that
shareholders approve the sale of its 20 percent stake in
Airbus to EADS for $3.5 billion.19 The recommendation
was approved the next month. Proceeds from the sale
could provide BAE with the funds to go on a buying
spree of U.S. defense companies. Similarly, other
EADS owners seem to be interested in going separate
ways.20 In 2006, both Lagardère and DaimlerChrysler
announced plans to decrease their stakes in EADS.
Because of the politically sensitive nature of EADS,
these reductions had to be done in such a way as to
preserve the Franco-German ownership balance.21
By early 2007, Germany’s control in EADS consisted
of DaimlerChrysler’s 15 percent holdings and an
additional 7.5 percent stake by a consortium of mostly
German banks, while France’s 22.5 percent ownership
was divided equally between Lagardère and the French
state. But this more simplified ownership structure could
be complicated by Spain, which is seeking to expand
its own aerospace and defense industries. Madrid
is interested in doubling its 5.5 percent ownership
share of EADS, since a greater stake would justify
redistributing more EADS and Airbus work to Spain.22
A new actor, Vneshtorgbank, obfuscated the situation
further in late 2006 when the second largest Russian
state-controlled bank acquired a 5.4 percent stake in
EADS through share purchases on the open market.
While the bulk of Europe’s aerospace and defense
electronics sectors has consolidated into BAE, EADS,
Thales, and Finmeccanica, other sectors have not
followed suit. These include principally land vehicles,
naval shipyards, and aircraft engines. Europe has 20
naval shipbuilders and 23 yards, while the United States
has only two companies making warships (Northrop
Grumman and General Dynamics) and six yards.23
13

Despite the overcapacity in Europe, a result of less
spending by governments on warships, consolidation
has been exceedingly slow since the naval sector
remains divided along national lines.24 Germany’s
ThyssenKrupp acquired Howaldtswerke-Deutsche
Werft (HDW), Germany’s biggest shipyard, in 2004 and
was renamed ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TMS).
In October 2004, the French government announced
plans to privatize as much as 49 percent of DCN, and
began prodding Thales to merge its naval business
with DCN. Such a union, then, would be in a stronger
position to combine with TMS, which is now Europe’s
largest shipyard group. This “EADS approach” to
naval consolidation still has to overcome contentious
issues over ownership and which shipyards (in France
or Germany) are to be closed. Other shipbuilders in
Italy and Spain also would need to be coaxed into
joining a Franco-German shipbuilder. Consequently,
the consolidation of the naval shipbuilding sector will
likely take time, despite the clear economic logic of
such a move.
Demand for military vehicles has dropped sharply
since the end of the Cold War.25 The German military
vehicles sector shrunk from 44,000 workers in 1989
to just 10,000 in 2000, while France’s GIAT reduced
its workforce from 17,000 in 1991 to 7,000 in 2001.
Spending by the UK Ministry of Defense on combat
vehicles dropped 70 percent between 1990 and 2000.
While the industry has responded to the decline in
demand with employment reductions, there has been
little in the way of company consolidation. In fact, the
number of manufacturers of light tracked vehicles
worldwide actually increased from 12 to 55 between
1993 and 2003. Consolidation has gone furthest in the
UK, with BAE’s 2004 acquisition of Alvis Vickers (a

14

company produced by Alvis’s acquisition of Vickers
from Rolls-Royce in 2002 and of GKN in 1998), making
it the only producer of military combat vehicles.
In Germany, there are two main producers of land
vehicles: Rheinmetall and KMW (the name given to
Wegmann’s acquisition of Krauss-Maffei’s military
operations). Finally, France’s state-owned GIAT is
that country’s lone producer. While four land vehicles
producers in three countries (and minor firms in other
countries) may not seem too unreasonable, the United
States, which spends far more than Europe on these
types of weapons systems, has only two companies:
General Dynamics and United Defense. Thus, there
is an economic logic for further consolidation within
Europe.
International.
Defense companies based in the United States and
Europe dominate the global market. Of the 14 largest
companies based on defense revenues, 10 are from
the United States (see Table 2). Of the top 30 defense
companies, 17 are headquartered in the United States
and 11 are European (see Tables 2, 3 and 4). Of the
top 60 companies, 30 are from the United States, 20
from Europe, and only 10 are based in other countries.
The global imbalance is even more staggering when
based on revenue. The top 10 U.S. defense companies
had combined defense revenues of more than $157
billion in 2005. The top 10 European companies had
total defense revenues of $61 billion, while the top
10 companies from outside the North Atlantic region
accumulated only $12 billion in defense sales.
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world
company
rank
Mitsubishi
23

30
31
43

45
46
47
52
53
57

Heavy
Industries 2, 3
Almaz-Antei 4
Israel Aircraft
Industries
Kawasaki
Heavy
Industries 2, 3
Hindustan
Aeronautics 2
Elbit Systems
Mitsubishi
Electric 2, 3
ST
Engineering
NEC 2, 3
Rafael
Armament
Development
Authority

2005
2005
defense
1 total
country revenue
revenue1
Japan
$2,056
$23,750

PERCENT
of
revenue
from
defense
9

Russia
Israel

1,568
1,560

1,742
2,341

90
67

Japan

1,103

11,249

10

India

1,053

1,170

90

Israel
Japan

998
971

1,070
30,658

93
3

Singapore

922

2,004

46

Japan
Israel

917
845

41,041
845

2
100

1. Figures are in U.S.$ million. Currency conversions calculated
using prevailing rates at the end of each firm’s fiscal year.
2. Fiscal year ending 3/31.
3. Defense revenue from Japan Defense Agency contracts.
4. Defense revenue is estimate by Center for Analysis of
Strategies and Technologies, Moscow.
Source: Figures derived from Defense News Top 100 (www.
defensenews.com/index.php?S=06top100)

Table 4. Top Ten Defense Companies Outside
United States and Europe (2005).
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Clearly, the U.S. defense industrial base dominates
the global defense industry. However, on some
important indicators, the U.S. defense industry may
be viewed as losing ground to foreign rivals. One area
is the global arms trade. Between 2001-05, the United
States has been the world’s second largest supplier of
arms behind Russia, and ahead of the EU (see Table
5). The combined exports from the 25 EU countries
comprised 27 percent of total global arms exports
over this period. The U.S. market share of the global
arms trade during this period was 30 percent, which
is comparable to the 1980s when U.S. firms had 2430 percent of the international arms market annually.
However, it is a significant drop from the 42-60 percent
market share that the United States had every year
between 1991-2000, and averaging 51 percent over that
10-year period. Part of the U.S. drop can be attributed
to a turnaround in the Russian defense industry, and
greater exports over the past couple of years from
France. Part, too, is due to a shrinking of the global
arms market. The global arms trade surpassed $40
billion each year during the height of the Cold War
between 1981 and 1983. By the mid-1990s, international
arms sales were barely half that level (in constant 1990
dollars). In 2000, the market fell below $20 billion and
stayed there until 2005. Between 2001-05, 40 percent
of U.S. defense exports went to established markets
in Europe, where defense spending has declined since
the end of the Cold War (see Table 6). The upshot is
that competition among defense companies for foreign
sales is intensifying.
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41,997
28.1%

World Total
US % of Total

37,241
27.5%

1986
14,378
10,229
2,629
1,302
1,733
N/A
301
342
334
275
2,143
25,928
44.9%

1991
5,221
11,641
902
2,372
1,394
N/A
85
423
506
184
1,100
22,079
47.0%

1996
3,589
10,377
1,651
1,618
1,526
236
171
381
414
118
707
17,332
31.8%

2001
5,548
5,516
1,133
640
1,070
702
110
190
185
459
408
16,139
28.9%

2002
5,656
4,662
1,259
632
708
281
351
249
332
114
472
18,248
28.2%

2003
5,567
5,139
1,268
1,639
567
536
568
339
310
271
428
19,834
29.3%

2004
6,440
5,818
2,514
837
797
519
577
250
204
324
146
21,961
32.3%

2005
5,771
7,101
2,399
1,855
791
188
365
840
827
592
129
93,514
30.2%

20012005
28,982
28,236
8,573
5,603
3,933
2,226
1,971
1,868
1,858
1,760
1,583
873,991
35.2%

19762005
272,290
307,469
62,657
43,456
43,049
6,056
6,121
12,176
18,369
6,507
28,092

Table 5. International Arms Sales:
Ranked by Top Eleven Suppliers of Major Conventional Weapons (2001-2005).1

Source: Bjorn Hagelin, Mark Bromley, and Siemon T. Wezeman, “International Arms Transfers,” in SIPRI
Yearbook 2006: Armaments Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm: Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/access.
html#twenty).

1. Figures are in U.S.$ million at constant (1990) prices.
2. Figures are for Soviet Union through 1991 and for Russia from 1992-2005.
3. Figures are for Federal Republic of Germany for 1981 and 1986.

1981
16,814
11,797
3,622
1,673
1,919
N/A
118
697
1,549
172
825

Supplier
Russia2
United States
France
Germany3
UK
Ukraine
Canada
Netherlands
Italy
Sweden
China

Region
Africa
Americas
Asia

Country

Total
209
1,512
6,933

Japan
Singapore
South Korea
Taiwan

1,432
1,165
1,639
1,927

Greece
Italy
Turkey
United Kingdom

2,857
1,369
1,318
2,374

Europe

11,283

Middle
East

7,233
Egypt
Israel
United Arab Emirates

Oceania
Total

2,274
2,565
1,516
1,070
28,236

Figures are in U.S.$ million at constant (1990) prices.
Source: Bjorn Hagelin, Mark Bromley, and Siemon T. Wezeman,
“International Arms Transfers,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments
Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Table 6. U.S. Arms Sales to Selected Regions
and Countries (2001-2005).
Of course, variations among home markets
can account for the decline in market shares. U.S.
companies, for example, have had plenty to sell to the
U.S. Government, as defense spending has risen sharply
since 2001 (see Table 1). Russian companies, on the
other hand, are far more dependent on foreign markets,
with the bulk of their arms exports going to just two
countries—China (43 percent) and India (25 percent).
While the U.S. Government bans arms sales to China,
that country and India have become important markets
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for many non-U.S. defense companies. Not only are they
major importers of armaments in their own right (China
and India were the world’s two largest arms importing
countries between 2001-05, accounting for 14 and 10
percent of all arms imports, respectively), but they are
viewed as rising powers that will have a significant
impact on international economics and politics over the
course of the 21st century. Consequently, the United
States has reoriented its relationship with India, and
now is more willing to see U.S. defense firms develop
collaborations with their Indian counterparts.26 India,
however, likely will treat such overtures with a degree
of wariness, since the country has been on the receiving
end of U.S. sanctions in the past, including those placed
on weapons and spare parts.
Despite its growing economic importance, India
was only the 43rd largest arms exporter over the 200105 period. China ranks 11th, but that is much lower
than its standing in the 1980s, when its arms exports
were comparable to France, Germany, and the UK. Both
countries expect to improve in this area in the coming
years, as economic development and the diffusion of
technology are expected to help domestic companies
produce more sophisticated armaments that have
wider appeal in global markets.
While there are few companies in the world that can
match the revenues of U.S. defense firms, globalization
is forcing companies to rethink their international
strategies in ways that may make U.S. companies more
foreign and international companies more American.
This theme is dealt with more fully in the following
sections.
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GLOBALIZATION AND FINANCE
Clearly, one of the most significant dimensions of
globalization is the ability to move money to almost
anywhere in the world at high speed. As countries have
removed capital controls, investors large and small
have more freedom to send their capital abroad and
invest in foreign markets. The defense industry is not
immune to this trend. Of the five largest U.S. defense
companies, Northrop Grumman has the largest share
of foreign ownership, with about 7.5 percent of its stock
held by foreigners. Lockheed Martin follows with 7.2
percent, Raytheon at 4.6 percent, General Dynamics at
3.5 percent, and Boeing at 7.8 percent.27 Many of these
shareholdings are owned by foreign mutual funds,
presumably on behalf of smaller investors who have
capital invested in the funds. U.S. defense companies
are among the least international in terms of foreign
ownership, although state-held firms in Russia,
China, and elsewhere often are even less so. European
companies, however, often have large blocs of foreign
ownership. Foreign shareholdings of BAE, for example,
have fluctuated around 45 percent in 2006, but were as
high as 59 percent in 2003.28
The finance dimension of globalization has
facilitated the ability of companies to list their shares
on multiple stock exchanges. DaimlerChrysler became
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1998,
thereby meeting a goal to have access to a larger pool
of investors. BAE also is considering a NYSE listing.
Similarly, in June 2006, EADS announced it was seeking
a listing on the Xetra Dax index of Germany’s Deutsche
Borse, which would add liquidity to the stock and give
it greater exposure to investors.29 These moves also can
increase financial transparency, as companies fulfill the
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requirements set by different stock exchanges, which
is an attractive feature for some investors.
Such trends in foreign portfolio investment,
however, are more than matched by cross-border
flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), which have
exploded over the past decade (see Table 7). According
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), an international organization
comprised of the world’s 30 most developed economies,
FDI flows have increased dramatically since the early
1990s. FDI outflows from OECD members rose from
about $200 billion annually between 1990 and 1993 to
$410 billion by 1997, $652 billion in 1998, over $1 trillion
in 1999, and more than $1.2 trillion in 2000.30 Outflows
have dropped sharply from the 1999-2000 boom years,
but have been over $600 billion each year from 200105. Similarly, FDI inflows among OECD members
passed $200 billion for the first time in 1995, rising to
$894 billion in 1999 and just under $1.3 trillion in 2000,
before stabilizing in the $500-600 billion range in each
of the past 5 years. The stock of inward investment
among OECD countries was estimated to be about
$7.3 trillion in 2004—a huge jump from $1.3 trillion in
1990. FDI has a tremendous impact on the recipient
country’s economy. In 2004, U.S. affiliates of foreign
(majority-owned nonblank) companies employed 5.1
million Americans, contributed $515 billion to U.S.
GDP, and accounted for 19 percent of U.S. exports and
26 percent of imports.31
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OECD Members
United States
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Netherlands
Canada
Spain
Mexico
Sweden
Italy
Japan

Cumulative Cumulative
FDI Inflows, FDI Inflows,
1996-2005 2002-051
1,540
653
425
403
313
228
225
164
157
115
60

Non-OECD
Countries
China
Hong Kong
Brazil
India
Russia

391
262
100
187
91
65
113
69
25
67
26

239
93
60
22
42

Figures are in US$ billion
1. Figures preliminary for 2004 and estimated for 2005
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment, June
2006

Table 7. Foreign Direct Investment Flows,
Selected Countries.
While FDI is expanding at a rapid pace for many
companies, defense firms in general have been
latecomers to this process. The United Nations
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Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
ranks the transnationality of companies based on
their foreign assets, sales, and employment as a
percentage of the company’s totals in these areas.
Interestingly, under UNCTAD’s measure, only two
major defense companies rank among the world’s
top 100 nonfinancial transnational corporations—
BAE Systems (ranked 17th) and United Technologies
(ranked 49th). Although this measure does not take
into account a company’s global supply chain, it
should not be too surprising that defense companies,
which long have focused on their relationship to their
home government, have a much higher percentage of
their assets, revenues, and employment based in their
home country. Nonetheless, the trend for virtually all
defense companies in the United States and abroad is
to extend their international operations. Consequently,
the remainder of this section focuses on aspects of
FDI that are of particular importance to the defense
industry.
Mergers and Acquisitions.
The globalization of capital has contributed to
the growth in cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) in nearly every sector, including defense. In
many OECD countries, they account for more than
half of total FDI. Cross-border M&As to and from
the 30 OECD countries amounted to $1.3 trillion in
2005—far more than the $281 billion in 1995 (see Table
8).32 Global M&A activity (i.e., accounting for OECD
and non-OECD members) was estimated to total $1.9
trillion for the first half of 2006—the highest half-year
volume on record, including the dotcom boom in the
1990s.33 Many of the deals have been financed with cash
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reserves, including two-thirds of those occurring in
the first quarter.34 This is one consequence of the costcutting and balance sheet strengthening that companies
have undergone as a result of increasing international
competition. Much of the M&A activity, particularly
in Europe where deals have outpaced the United
States in 2006, is within industries. Such “horizontal
integration,” which seeks to build efficiencies through
cost-cutting and economies of scale, has been slower
to come to Europe. But 2006 has seen Germany’s Eon
bid €29 billion for Spain’s Endesa in the utilities sector,
and Enel of Italy seek to acquire the water and power
company Suez of France (effectively blocked when the
French government persuaded Gaz de France to merge
with Suez instead). Increasing integration within the
EU, including the restructuring that was expected with
the introduction of the Euro, is helping to spur this
M&A activity.
1995
2000
2003
2004
2005
Estimate
2006

Outward
134.1
1,166.4
321.3
418.8
670.8

Inward
146.5
1,135.8
337.8
441.3
626.9

566.9

554.3

Figures are in US$ billion.
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment, June
2006

Table 8. Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
to and from OECD Countries.
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Within the defense industry, there is more
opportunity for M&A activity in Europe than in
the United States. As described earlier, much of
the consolidation of the U.S. defense industry was
completed by the mid-1990s. There was not much significant movement in Europe until the late 1990s. The
first wave of consolidations led to British Aerospace’s
acquisition of GEC and the formation of EADS
through the uniting of French, German, and Spanish
aerospace companies. It is very likely that a second
round of M&A activity is about to begin. Europe’s land
vehicles and shipyards are ripe for consolidation, and
EADS has made overtures to Thales. A union between
these two companies would give EADS a dominant
presence in defense electronics, but Thales has resisted
these overtures, despite encouragement from French
Defense Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie to create a
single European satellite maker.35 However, there
is industrial (and political) logic to the unification of
Thales with Italy’s Finmeccanica, since both companies
have closer relationships to the Pentagon and UK
Defense Ministry than does EADS. Other companies
are restructuring in preparation for M&A activity. In
early 2006, MBDA, Europe’s leading missile maker and
co-owned by EADS (37.5 percent), BAE (37.5 percent),
and Finmeccanica (25 percent), announced plans to
cut 10 percent of its staff prior to embarking on a fresh
wave of cross-border consolidation.36
While still small when compared to the number
of mergers among U.S. companies, there have
been significant transatlantic deals that have been
facilitated by increased capital mobility. In March
2005, BAE agreed to buy the U.S. combat vehicle and
armaments manufacturer United Defense Industries
for $4.1 billion.37 The largest acquisition in BAE’s
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history, financed in part by the sale of stakes in
several European joint ventures (including those with
Finmeccanica and Saab) worth about $1.9 billion, made
the company’s U.S. arm the fifth-largest defense firm in
the United States. Ironically, this deal came a year after
BAE thwarted General Dynamics’ attempt to acquire
the UK armored vehicle maker, Alvis, by offering a
higher bid, thereby engineering a national rather than
transatlantic consolidation in land vehicles.38
Defense industry M&As have followed a distinct
pattern. The first phase consisted of regional mergers
(first in the United States, followed by Europe) that
led to the formation of large companies in the defense
aerospace and electronics sectors. The second phase
appears to be unfolding in two ways: consolidation in
the land armaments and naval sectors, as well as large
firms buying smaller ones on the opposite side of the
Atlantic Ocean.
But it is talk of a big transatlantic aerospace
and defense industry merger that has captured the
imagination of many executives and government
officials. Perhaps the most attractive European firm
from the U.S. perspective is BAE. General Dynamics,
Boeing, and Lockheed Martin all have negotiated
with BAE, but the deals fell apart when BAE refused
to sell its profitable and fast-growing North American
operations.39 BAE sells more to the U.S. Government
than any other non-U.S. company, which would make
it a valuable acquisition for a U.S. defense contractor.
BAE Systems Inc., the U.S. subsidiary, has seen its sales
grow 250 percent in 5 years, and has made more than
a dozen acquisitions since 2000.40 The U.S. subsidiary
also employs 45,000 of BAE’s 100,000 workers.41 In fact,
BAE is trying to be so “American” that it is on track to
be one of the top 20 corporate donors in the current
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U.S. election cycle.42 Yet, while the U.S. defense market
is extremely important to BAE, so are the European
defense and civilian markets. With the recent sale of
its 20 percent stake in Airbus, it will be more difficult
for BAE to claim that it is both a European and North
American company. Publicly, BAE claims that it is
not interested in selling its North American business
unit. Certainly, a U.S. firm could make an offer that
BAE reasonably could not refuse, but negotiations
by Northrop Grumman and Boeing have yielded no
results and the premium that BAE would demand is
too costly for any U.S. company at this time.
Foreign Investment and Protectionism.
While much of the evidence suggests that FDI and
M&A activity is on the rise, there are concerns that
global financial flows are facing politically-motivated
obstacles. In many cases, national security is being
raised as an excuse to prevent acquisitions. This was
evident in early 2006, when several high profile mergers
were opposed by European national authorities,
including Mittal Steel’s bid for Arcelor and the utilities
deals mentioned above.
Some European governments are implementing
measures to make defense industry companies more
difficult to acquire. The 2002 acquisition of the German
shipyard Howaldtswerke Deutsche Werft (HDW)
by One Equity Partners (OEP), a U.S. institutional
investor, led to fears of a sell out of the German arms
industry. These fears were ameliorated somewhat in
2004, when HDW was merged with the shipyards
of Thyssen Krupp, with OEP’s stake reduced to 25
percent. However, rules for foreign ownership of
defense-related companies were tightened in 2004
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and 2005 to stipulate that the acquisition of more than
25 percent of the voting rights in a German company
producing armaments, ammunition, or cryptographic
programs has to be reported to the Federal Ministry
of Economics and Labour.43 The Ministry then has the
right to prevent the investment if necessary to safeguard
“important security interests.” The list of covered
activities was expanded in 2005 to include companies
producing and developing engines and gear systems
for tanks and similar armored military vehicles. In
December 2004, the French government presented
11 sectors (including: businesses relating to certain
dual-use items and technology; cryptology services;
weapons, munitions, and explosive substances for
military purposes; and activities involving design or
equipment supply contracts with the French Defense
Ministry) for which foreign investment would require
government authorization. Under the new rules, prior
authorization is needed for investment not only in
arms manufacturing, but in all companies operating in
“the interest of national defense.” Russia, too, is in the
process of drafting legislation regarding the protection
of strategic sectors from foreign ownership. The
proposed law would cover a few closed sectors and
contain a list of approximately 39 sectors, including
arms and defense-related sectors as well as nuclear
energy and aerospace industries, in which foreign
investors would need government authorization to
acquire more than 50 percent ownership.
The United States also is showing increasing
signs of protectionism with respect to FDI. In 2005,
China’s national oil company CNOOC sought to
acquire Unocal, but withdrew its bid once vociferous
opposition was mounted within the United States. In
early 2006, Dubai Ports World (DPW), a ports operator
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based in the United Arab Emirates, sought to acquire
British-based P&O. The acquisition, which would have
placed six U.S. port terminals under DPW, faced even
greater criticism from Congress and a large segment
of the public. Much of the criticism was targeted at
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (CFIUS), the secretive inter-agency panel that
reviews deals for potential national security problems.
In response to the DPW controversy, Congress has
sought to revise the procedure for reviewing foreign
acquisitions of U.S. companies for security purposes,
with House and Senate committees passing rather
different bills in spring 2006. Among the proposals
are the development of a secret ranking system based
on a country’s relationship with the United States,
including each country’s adherence to non-proliferation
control regimes and potential for trans-shipments or
diversions of militarily sensitive technologies, and more
Congressional oversight over CFIUS investigations.44
Business groups, including the Organization for
International Investment (OFII), which represents
U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies, have lobbied
Congress to not make regulations so stringent that
the United States becomes an unattractive location
for foreign investment.45 U.S. Secretary of Homeland
Security Michael Chertoff suggested that the emotional
response to the acquisition threatens to damage the
country’s economy.46 Likewise, U.S. Treasury Secretary
John Snow and Bruce Josten, Executive Vice-President
at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, expressed concern
that the reaction by lawmakers would send a signal
that foreign investments from certain parts of the
world, particularly the Middle East, are not welcome.
In an era of ever-increasing cross-border deals, the
issue of whether national security will be adversely
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affected by the acquisition of U.S. assets will become
more prominent. In March 2006, France’s Alcatel
reached an agreement with US-based Lucent to merge
the companies. While EU regulators and the U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) have approved the $36 billion merger, the CFIUS
has yet to give its opinion. This merger does have a
significant national security dimension, since one of
Lucent’s subsidiaries is Bell Labs, which has done much
work in ballistic missile technology, submarine sonar,
and communications satellites. The French government
had similar concerns about Alcatel’s sensitive military
contracts, which were relieved when the company’s
satellite business was acquired by Thales in exchange
for €1.7 billion and an increase in Alcatel’s stake in
Thales to 21.6 percent.47
Toshiba’s proposed acquisition of Westinghouse
will be scrutinized since the combined entity would
be the world’s largest nuclear power company. The
scrutiny is in part due to the Japanese company’s
tarnished reputation in U.S. security circles. Toshiba got
into trouble in 1988, when the United States banned U.S.
Government procurements of Toshiba products and
banned imports of products from a Toshiba subsidiary
for selling submarine-silencing equipment to the
Soviet Union in violation of an international agreement
among countries, including Europe, the United States
and Japan, to keep high-tech equipment with military
uses out of the communist bloc.48 One consequence
of the DPW case is that companies may now believe
their deals must get approval from a broader range of
national and state politicians, including key members
of Congress as well as governors, since approval from
formal channels (i.e., CFIUS, Department of Justice,
and FTC) may not be sufficient.49
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Such actions in the United States and elsewhere
prompted the OECD, in its 2006 report on trends and
recent developments in FDI, to conclude that, “[w]hile
many developing and emerging economies continue
to take steps to open their economies to international
participation, the international security situation
and fears of negative consequences of globalization
have prompted the governments of several OECD
countries to review their FDI regulations. . . .Without
contesting sovereign nations’ right to regulate, there
is a risk that regulatory action may sometimes exceed
what is needed to safeguard essential interests and be
motivated by protectionist motives.”50 Care, therefore,
must be taken to ensure that FDI even in defense and
defense-related industries is not deterred unless the
national security screen has met the highest standard.
Political obstacles exist on the European side as
well, particularly in areas like shipbuilding and land
vehicles. Before being acquired by BAE, United Defense
reportedly presented a takeover bid to Germany’s
Rheinmetall, while General Dynamics was interested
in purchasing the 49 percent stake in KMW held by
Siemens. However, the German government opposes
takeovers of German military vehicles producers
by U.S. companies.51 Additionally, the ownership
structure of the military vehicles industry in Germany
and France makes international acquisitions difficult.
Two families hold controlling stakes in KMW and
Rheinmetall, which serves to prohibit hostile takeovers
and reduce the pressure for maximizing shareholder
value. In France, state-ownership makes the acquisition
of GIAT all but impossible. Only BAE is a serious player
in transatlantic mergers in the land vehicles area, and
it emphasized this position with its acquisition of
United Defense. With General Dynamics the only U.S.-
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owned producer of land vehicles, it is unlikely that the
Pentagon would permit the company’s takeover—even
if there were a European company with whom such a
merger would make strategic sense.
Privatization.
Another trend stimulated by globalization and
which impacts foreign investment is the privatization
of assets formerly held by governments. While
this trend has affected companies in virtually all
industries, it has been somewhat slower to come to
the defense industry, which is not too surprising
given the delicate relationship of this sector to national
security. Nonetheless, European governments started
to privatize segments of their defense industry in
the mid-1990s, shedding control over some defense
companies partly to meet the financial criteria of the
EU’s common currency, and partly due to ideological
changes that were shaped by increased international
competition.
The trend has since progressed to other countries,
with the case of India presenting both opportunities
and challenges for U.S. defense companies.52 In March
2006, India appointed private sector Indian companies
as prime contractors for rocket launchers. Until now,
defense integration work has been done by government
corporations or by overseas suppliers. About 70 percent
of India’s defense capital budget is spent abroad because
of the limitations of its public sector, and because FDI
in private sector defense companies was banned until
2002. However, the government decided in 2005 that 30
percent of the value of foreign defense contracts over
3 billion rupees (about $66 million) should be offset
by purchases, investments, and technology transfer
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to India. The objective is to persuade foreign defense
contractors—especially U.S. companies—to engage
in joint ventures, which in turn would boost India’s
defense exports. The strategy is seen as a way for India
to build on the success of its information-technology
outsourcing companies.
The approach seems to be working. EADS plans
to invest $2 billion in the country over the next 15
years, primarily through a technology center to
house Engineering Centre Airbus India, which will
focus on high-end engineering design and analysis.53
Additionally, EADS has partnered with the Indian
Defense Avionics Research Establishment to develop
a missile warning system for the Indian Air Force,
and with Antrix (the commercial arm of the Indian
Space Research Organization) to jointly develop
communications satellites.
In the United States, privatization has taken the
form of outsourcing, that is hiring private companies
to undertake work previously done by the military.
Outsourcing picked up speed in the 1980s, when the
Reagan Administration sought to privatize a range
of government functions, and continued in the 1990s,
as the Clinton Administration outsourced food,
transportation, and other services as part of its strategy
to shrink the military. But it is the Bush Administration
that has moved furthest in this area, with payments
to contractors for providing food, shelter, security,
and other services rising from $53 billion in 2000 to
$104 billion in 2004.54 According to the Congressional
Research Service, of the approximately $365 billion
spent on the Iraq war and fight against terrorism
since late 2002, about $60 billion (16 percent) has
been paid to contractors for services. Controversially,
oversight safeguards were lifted prior to the Iraq war,
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including the Department of Defense’s (DoD) ability
to circumvent competitive bidding rules in emergency
situations. Consequently, sole-source and other noncompetitive contracts awarded by the Pentagon have
increased 54 percent since 2000, from $65 billion to
$100 billion. Although instances of fraud and waste are
prevalent, including a finding by Defense Department
auditors that Kellogg, Brown & Root (a Halliburton
subsidiary) had billed the government $1.2 billion for
questionable charges, a Congressional Budget Office
study suggests that outsourcing is still a net benefit for
the Pentagon.
The liberalizing forces of privatization have had
mixed effects around the world. While the United States
has moved toward more subcontracting of previously
government operated services, and some European
countries have sold off state defense assets, other
countries have been slower—even reluctant—to initiate
such actions. Indonesia’s parliament in 2004 passed a
bill requiring the country’s powerful military, known
as the TNI, to divest all the businesses it controlled
within five years. However, by the summer of 2006,
the government had resigned itself to the fact that only
six or seven of the TNI’s 1,500 businesses would be
sold off.55 Amnesty International has singled out China
for selling a considerable amount of conventional
weapons and small arms to repressive regimes and
parties involved in civil wars.56 Many of the companies
involved in the arms trade are companies established
by the People’s Liberation Army and the police state
agency, which benefit from the revenues.
The privatization and liberalization pressures
of globalization also have their limits when they
confront government-led industrialization strategies.
In February 2006, Russia merged all of the country’s
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aircraft manufacturers (including Tupolev, Ilyushin,
and Mig) into one state-run holding company (the
government intends to retain a 75 percent stake) to be
called Unified Aircraft Corporation (UAC).57 The new
company will also incorporate Irkut, a publicly traded
company that is partly owned by EADS. Reflecting the
multidimensionality of globalization, Russia is also
looking outward to develop strategic ties with foreign
partners. Airbus is in talks with the Russian government
to create a $25 billion “life-time” partnership that
would include developing new aircraft, ordering
parts for the A-350 airliner, converting passenger
jets to carry cargo, and financing a new-generation
aircraft program. Although the Russian government,
as mentioned above, views aerospace as a strategic
sector, it presented legislation that would loosen
restrictions on foreign participation in aircraft projects,
including up to 49 percent ownership stakes (up from
the present 25 percent limit).58 This is characteristic
of Russia’s current economic development strategy,
which typically begins with domestic industry
consolidation with significant government influence
over the new entity, and then is followed by an
opening to foreign partners with minority stakes.
The hope is that domestic consolidation, followed
by foreign investment and technology transfer, will
revive an aerospace industry that made one-quarter
of the world’s aircraft during the Cold War years, but
has since faltered (the export of some MiG and Sukhoi
military aircraft notwithstanding).
Production.
Another important dimension of globalization is a
more complex level of international production. One
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of the motivating factors for companies to expand FDI
is to have access to sources of production in multiple
locations. The reasons are both economic and political.
Companies, searching for a different mix of workers,
new markets, and technological developments, are
more willing to manufacture parts of their products
abroad. One benefit is reduced costs, since producing
some or all of a product abroad may give firms cost
advantages vis-à-vis their international competitors.
While international economic competition is driving
most of this process, politics also plays a key role in some
sectors, particularly those that provide opportunities
for producing higher value-added goods, technology
transfer, good paying jobs (relative to what domestic
firms typically pay), and higher levels of exports.
Additionally, and especially pertinent to defense firms,
production abroad may be necessary to win contracts
and sell products in other countries. The defense
industry, and those sectors related to it like aerospace,
electronics, and information technology (IT), is among
the more prominent sectors that are driven by these
forces. While multi-nation weapons projects originated
in the 1960s, and were motivated primarily (but not
exclusively) by political reasons, the scale, cost, and
complexity of such programs today make cross-border
collaborations an economic necessity.
One example is the Galileo project—a joint
undertaking by the EU and the European Space
Agency to be Europe’s alternative to the U.S. Global
Positioning System (GPS).59 Galileo was given the goahead in May 2003 by European governments who
agreed to fund the €3.2 billion project. The target is to
have 27 satellites fully operational by 2008. However,
Galileo is not a solely European project, as China has
agreed to invest €200 million in the collaboration,

37

and India and Israel among other countries are also
lobbying to participate. Such countries are barred
from collaboration on GPS since it is largely a military
system run by the Pentagon. The EU views Galileo as a
move away from dependence on the Pentagon’s GPS,
and a step towards a common defense. It is telling that
non-European countries have been included in, or may
yet join, Galileo. Their involvement reduces funding
requirements from European defense budgets. The U.S.
GPS system is closed to outsiders for security reasons.
Corporate participants in Galileo include EADS,
Thales, Alcatel (France), Inmarsat (UK), Finmeccanica,
Aena (Spain), and Hispasat (Spain) in Europe, plus
companies from a dozen other countries.
But the aerospace industry is perhaps the
most competitive when it comes to developing an
international production base. Aerospace is leading
other segments of the defense industry in developing
a global base of production. Boeing and Airbus, the
world’s two dominant aerospace companies, seem
to regard the world as their playing field, and as the
United States and Soviet Union did during the Cold
War, they are fighting economic proxy wars through
third parties.
While civilian aircraft outsell the military variety,
there are technological spillovers that are increasingly
going from the civilian to military direction. Both
companies experienced their best order year in 2005,
and the growth of developing countries played a major
role.60 In 2005, Airbus booked 526 plane orders in Asia
valued at $39.4 billion, while Boeing sold 381 planes
valued at $45.5 billion. China alone agreed to purchase
150 aircraft from each company. Carriers in China,
India, and other Asian countries accounted for more
than 40 percent of the 2,057 airplanes that Airbus and
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Boeing booked. Airbus believes Asian airlines will be
the biggest buyers of large aircraft by 2023, and Boeing
thinks China will be the second biggest market (after
North America) over the next 20 years. By the early
2020s, China may make up 60 percent of orders for
planes seating more than 450 people. Rising incomes
in China and India have sparked a demand for more
air service, and Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics
is expected to accelerate tourism to China. China’s air
traffic is expected to grow 8.8 percent annually through
2024, and India’s is projected to grow 25 percent yearly
through 2010. Clearly, during the first half of this
century, Asia will be of utmost importance to Airbus
and Boeing for economic reasons, as it also will be for
Europe and the United States for geopolitical ones.
Airbus and Boeing have found that they have to
work with national governments in such key markets.
The globalization of the aerospace industry has brought
new players to the industry. Because a 1992 agreement
between the U.S. and European governments limited the
subsidies Boeing could receive in the United States, the
company searched abroad when it began development
of its new 787 Dreamliner. Japan has long sought to
develop a greater presence in the aerospace industry.61
Since the 787 project was an opportunity for Japan
to develop a major stake in the plane’s development,
the Japanese government provided $1.6 billion of
repayable launch aid (like Airbus gets in Europe).
Consequently, Boeing can now share the risk of this
new model with Mistubishi, Fuji, and Kawasaki, as the
three Japanese companies will collaborate in designing
the wings-fuselage interface.62 In return, about a third
of Boeing’s 787 aircraft will be built in Japan. For
Boeing, doing more production abroad helps to win
orders. In the 1960s, only two percent of the content of
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Boeing’s 727 was non-American. By the mid-1990s, this
had increased to 30 percent in the 777 model. Going
forward, at least 70 percent of the 787 Dreamliner will
be built outside the United States, mostly in Japan.63
Airbus has not given up on Japan, even though its
market share there is only 1-2 percent. In February 2005,
the company appointed a new head for its Japanese unit
and vowed to break Boeing’s monopoly in the world’s
second largest civil aviation market, aiming for a 50
percent market share by 2010.64 Given these obstacles,
Airbus is responding to Boeing’s seeming stranglehold
on the Japanese airline market and is cooperating with
that country’s aerospace industry with a wider Asian
strategy. Airbus executives envision the transformation
of Airbus from a European champion to a global
company that can challenge an increasingly global
Boeing.65 Given Boeing’s strategy of building ties with
major Japanese companies, a plausible Airbus response
would be to develop alliances in China. The company
already has a joint venture there (an engineering center
with a local aircraft manufacturer), and the Chinese
have been offered a five percent risk-bearing share
of the new A350 model (designed to compete with
Boeing’s 787). Airbus foresees similar collaboration
with local partners in India and Russia, both of which
are expected to experience strong growth in air traffic
in coming years.
Given the stakes involved in the Boeing-Airbus
rivalry, in terms of market share, exports, technological
innovation, and prestige, it is not surprising that
government officials in the United States and Europe
are working on their respective aerospace company’s
behalf in Asia and other markets. U.S. Government
officials and their European equivalents play an active
role lobbying on behalf of their company. In early 2005,

40

Britain, France, and Germany placed political pressure
on Poland to buy Airbus aircraft valued at about $500
million for its state-owned carrier Lot.66 The leaders of
each country at the time (Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac,
and Gerhard Schroder, respectively) made the case
to the Polish government that the decision would be
an implicit test of the country’s European credentials.
In the end, under heavy pressure from U.S. officials,
Poland chose to purchase seven Boeing 787s. By the end
of the year, after even heavier lobbying by European
officials, Airbus closed a deal to sell 150 A320 aircraft
(worth almost $10 billion) to Chinese airlines, more
than the 70 planes (listed at about $4 billion) that
Boeing sold.67 Such intensive lobbying efforts are not
always successful. The French government has been
unsuccessful in persuading Norway, the Netherlands,
South Korea, or Singapore to purchase the Dassaultbuilt Rafale fighter aircraft.68
The Europeans even are trying to build an aerospace
presence in the United States. According to EU trade
commissioner Peter Mandelson, the Airbus superjumbo
A380 will likely have more U.S.-built components than
the Boeing 787.69 He also has claimed that Airbus buys
about $6 billion worth of U.S. goods a year, supporting
140,000 jobs in 40 states. Airbus, in an effort to improve
its image in the United States, took out a full two-page
advertisement in the May 7, 2004 Washington Post. Titled
“America is on board the A380,” the advertisement
listed hundreds of U.S.-based suppliers, highlighted
the economic impact of Airbus in the United States,
and stated that U.S. companies will produce half of
the Airbus A380. Despite Boeing’s dominance in the
United States, the U.S. defense market is very attractive
to Airbus, and EADS even plans to build a factory in
Louisiana to build air-refueling tankers, should it win
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an Air Force contract.70 If this project goes forward,
Airbus would supply “green aircraft”—completely
unequipped A330s assembled in Toulouse, which
would be fitted out at the U.S. plant.71
The intense rivalry between Airbus and Boeing
presents opportunities for other firms to play this to
their advantage. Italy’s Finmeccania has pursued such
a strategy to its benefit. According to the Wall Street
Journal, “Finmeccanica . . . reflects the increasingly
global aerospace industry, where international
partnerships abound and rivals are interlaced through
common suppliers.”72 For example, the Italian company
supplies Boeing with components for the 787, works
with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman on the
Joint Strike Fighter, and collaborates with Lockheed
Martin and Textron’s Bell Helicopter unit on the Marine
One fleet of presidential helicopters. Finmeccanica
also partners with Airbus on the A380, with BAE and
EADS on the Eurofighter, with France’s Alcatel on
satellite and space products, and with BAE and EADS
on missiles. But the strategy of trying to develop close
relations with both Boeing and Airbus does carry risks.
Part of the EU’s response to the WTO case filed by the
U.S. (discussed below) is that the Italian government
provides aid to Boeing projects through Finmeccanica.
Attempts by Airbus and EADS to bring Finmeccanica
into a tighter relationship, including offering the Italian
company a ten percent stake in Airbus in 2000, have
not been successful.
U.S. defense companies that are more reliant on
defense sales, such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop
Grumman, Raytheon, and General Dynamics, are
not under the same kind of pressure to expand their
international production base as are Boeing and
Airbus. Their international strategy tends to take the
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form of collaborations that, for political and economic
reasons, allocate development and production among
companies from different countries. While such
collaborations are almost entirely between North
American and European companies, this may change
as other countries (thanks to Boeing and Airbus)
develop greater capabilities in aerospace technology
and production.
For investment reasons already discussed, and
labor reasons that will be outlined below, product
supply chains now integrate multiple countries. The
globalization of production is, in part, a response by
firms to lower costs in an increasingly competitive
marketplace. Host countries see many opportunities
from attracting FDI, and the increasing “statelessness”
of multinational corporations makes production in
a variety of countries a necessary strategy. Boeing
is a good example of a U.S. defense company that
has developed increasingly intricate global supply
chains. Boeing used to design and engineer all
of its aircraft models itself. But with the new 787
Dreamliner, Boeing has scoured the world to find the
best possible suppliers (or “partners” in the upgraded
terminology).73 Boeing’s new global partners number
just under 100, far fewer than the 500-700 utilized in
the 777 aircraft; but each has a much higher degree
of responsibility for their portion of the work, as well
as the overall project. Similarly, Airbus counts 18,000
suppliers in 30 countries (including 100,000 workers in
the United States) involved in the construction of the
A380 superjumbo aircraft.74
Boeing and Airbus have two motivations for such
strategies. The first is to increase efficiencies by seeking
the best suppliers—regardless of location. The second
is to persuade prospective buyers (such as nationally-
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owned airlines) to purchase their planes. For the
suppliers, and more specifically, their governments,
this is an opportunity to build an aerospace and
defense industrial base. In June 2006, Airbus selected a
site in Tianjin as the best location in China to assemble
aircraft.75 Airbus forecasts that China will order
more than $230 billion in new aircraft by 2023. Since
the centrally-controlled ordering process is highlypoliticized, Airbus is betting that building aircraft in
China (and the technology transfer that goes with it)
will strengthen its position vis-à-vis Boeing. For China,
this is part of an industrial strategy to build its aerospace
and defense sector since, as discussed earlier, there are
close links between the two.
While allocating production or assembly operations
to foreign companies has become a requirement to
make sales abroad, the sharing of technologies makes
this an extremely sensitive issue. Understandably,
DoD does not want state-of-the-art technologies to fall
into the hands of potential adversaries, and so (along
with Congress) places limits on what technologies
can go abroad and to which countries. This puts
defense companies in a very awkward position—if
shared technologies fall into the wrong hands, firms
will be in trouble with the Pentagon; if restrictions on
technology sharing are too tight, it will be difficult
to consummate a sale to a foreign government. This
issue has irritated participants in the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) program.76 Originally designed to satisfy
the requirements of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and
Marines, the $276 billion program was too expensive
for the United States to undertake on its own. Eight
countries agreed to participate in the program, with
the expectation that their financial contributions would
permit them to have access to the plane’s technology
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(especially computer codes that would enable upgrades
to be done without U.S. help), so that they can support
and maintain the aircraft during its 30- to 40-year
service life. By the end of 2006, Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and
the UK need to sign agreements committing them to
production, but nearly every participant has threatened
that their participation in production is dependent on
sharing of technology. The United States insists that
the JSF, whose design, development, and production
is managed by Lockheed Martin with substantial
assistance from Northrop Grumman and BAE, will
consist of two versions: one for the United States and
one for export. The UK, which already has committed
$2 billion in development money to the JSF program
and plans to buy 150 of the planes, is particularly upset
about this outcome. Given its support for the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, the British government feels
that their country is entitled to the highest levels of
technology transfer and has threatened to pull out of
the project if it is not treated as an equal partner.77
Despite the pressures of globalization, political
obstacles still can distort the economics of armaments
production. EADS is demanding that the British
government guarantee the company a greater share
of defense and aerospace contracts in exchange for
its continued investment in the UK, now that BAE
has sold its 20 percent stake in Airbus.78 Given that
EADS trails BAE and even Thales and Finmeccanica
in terms of defense sales in the UK, London may have
to show more interest in EADS if it wants to ensure
that thousands of its citizens will continue to have
jobs supplying EADS with Airbus wings and other
products.
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE
A key component of globalization is the promotion
of international trade by reducing tariffs and other
national barriers. The WTO has been the major
global forum for reducing trade barriers. In 2005,
world exports of merchandise totaled $10.1 trillion,
representing a 10 percent annual increase since
2000.79 Exports of commercial services also jumped
by a 10 percent annual rate over this period, reaching
$2.4 trillion in 2005. In addition to this 149-member
body, the WTO estimates that almost 300 regional
trade agreements are operating or under negotiation.
Bilateral agreements also have increased over the
past decade. While the trade of armaments largely is
excluded from such arrangements, defense-related
products (including dual-use goods) often are not. The
globalization of trade also has made it easier for certain
types of weapons (such as small arms) to be traded.
Also, firms like United Technologies that produce for
both military and civilian markets are susceptible to
increased global competition on the civilian side, even
as the military side of their business may be fairly
protected. Nonetheless, such firms may be forced to
respond by restructuring, selling divisions, reducing
workforces, or ultimately going out of business—which
could seriously affect the defense industrial base.
As a major driver of globalization, technology is
particularly important to the defense industry. Despite
attempts by U.S. defense firms to stay technologically
ahead of potential adversaries, there is reason to
believe that the technology gap closes more quickly
now than in previous decades. Increasing U.S. concerns
about technology transfer may be a logical response
to globalization, but it has created frictions with allies
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participating in the Joint Strike Fighter and other
programs. This example highlights the tensions that
may arise in devising policies to address components of
globalization (e.g., technology, trade, and production)
that have disparate effects on a particular industry.
Technology even has changed the composition of
defense industry rankings, with “nontraditional”
firms like L-3 Communications, Science Applications
International, and Computer Sciences Corp. now
among the top U.S. firms in terms of defense revenues.
One consequence of increased international trade
is a corresponding increase in demand for natural
resources and raw materials. Global economic growth
in recent years, particularly in booming economies like
China, has increased the demand for commodities.
During the summer of 2006, oil reached $78.40 a barrel,
nickel surpassed $26,000 a ton, and copper topped
$8,000 a ton—all records in nominal terms.80 The defense
industry, which uses many of these commodities,
particularly specialty metals, has borne increased costs
as a result of the competition with other industries for
supplies. Boeing, for one, is engaged in an accelerated
effort to improve productivity to combat the impact
on its profitability from rising prices for aluminum,
titanium, carbon fiber, and copper.81 Lightweight
resilient metals such as titanium have wide application
in aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles. Such concern
prompted the Pentagon to launch an investigation into
whether metal prices could affect the price of large-scale
weapons systems.82 In Congress, a version of the 2005
defense bill raised concern over “increasing reliance on
foreign sources of supply” for weapons programs, and
the House armed services committee recommended
that the Pentagon review stockpiles to ensure the
military had proper access to those materials.
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In response to these trends, China has opted to
increase its trade and investment ties with Africa, which
is home to many minerals used in industrial production,
including oil. In fact, China’s rapidly expanding
economy has made it the world’s second largest oil
importer behind the United States. China-Africa trade
has nearly quadrupled since 2001, catapulting China
to become the continent’s third biggest trading partner
behind the United States and France, and there are
some 900 Chinese investment projects in Africa.83 About
78,000 Chinese workers are in Africa, many working on
oil, mining, and infrastructure projects. Oil companies
Sinopec and CNOOC have made major investments in
countries like Nigeria and Angola, and Africa supplies
almost a third of China’s oil imports.84 To the extent
that China may be a major national security concern for
the United States over the course of the 21st century,
Beijing’s efforts to secure supplies of oil, raw materials,
and other commodities on the world market will impact
the costs for U.S. defense firms (and the prices that the
Pentagon and other buyers will be forced to pay). Of
course, China’s weapons exports to Africa, such as the
12 military aircraft sold to the repressive government of
Zimbabwe in 2005-06, represents an entirely different
set of U.S. national security concerns.85
While increased global economic activity has led
to increased competition for certain industrial inputs,
in many cases it also has forced down the prices of
finished goods. Some of these goods are, in turn, inputs
into weapons systems, thereby lowering the prices of
these products. For example, flat-screen panel prices
have dropped by 25-30 percent in the 12 months to July
2006 due to global oversupply.86
The global arms trade is not governed by WTO
rules, since a country cannot be prevented from taking
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actions that it considers necessary for the protection
of its essential security interests. But the same forces
of globalization that have facilitated the trade of
“nonarms” goods and services—multinational supply
chains, complex transportation logistics, penetration
of new markets, and innovative financing—also have
helped the weapons industry. A more complicated
issue is the trade of dual-use goods, or goods that can be
used for both civilian and military applications. In the
summer of 2006, the United States proposed to tighten
controls on the export of high technology goods to
China.87 While China obviously was disappointed by
the Department of Commerce’s plans, U.S. industry is
expected to mount a strong protest, arguing that foreign
competitors are not bound by the same restrictions on
transfer of civilian technology.
Like the foreign investment trends discussed
above, the effects of increasing international trade
flows affect defense companies in multifaceted ways.
But perhaps the most intriguing is the increasingly
complex manner in which they are interconnected. If
firms want to enhance their opportunities to diversify
their sales base by penetrating foreign markets, simply
building weapons and related products in their home
country will no longer cut it. As a result, one option is
to build alliances with strategic partners. This strategy
helps defense companies offset the disadvantage of not
being a native firm.
For example, European governments are showing
a growing inclination to procure weapons from
European companies, which is upsetting some U.S.
defense firms that often could rely on steady sales to
U.S. allies. Airbus’s military subsidiary beat Boeing
and Lockheed Martin to win a €20 billion contract
to supply seven European countries with 180 new
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military transport aircraft—the A400M.88 The A400M,
due into service in 2009, is the first time Airbus has
undertaken an all-new project in the defense market.89
But the most important test for Airbus came in January
2004, when the UK Ministry of Defence opted to spend
$23 billion on refueling aircraft from EADS.90 The 27year contract was a major blow to Boeing, which has a
near monopoly on tanker aircraft, and to BAE, which
had teamed up with the U.S. firm in the expectation
that they would win the competition. The EADSheaded consortium included Rolls-Royce, which will
manufacture the tankers’ engines, and Thales, which
will produce much of the avionics in factories in
Britain. Losing the UK contract would have effectively
shut Airbus and EADS out of the tanker market. While
the actual factors determining the outcome of the
decision may never be known, it is likely that national
industrial issues played a major role. The Airbus-led
team, AirTanker, emphasized that its A330s are built
partly in the UK, and half of all new planes and 90
percent of conversions of the old aircraft used for their
bid will be built in the UK. AirTanker claimed that
7,500 jobs would be added or sustained if their bid was
picked, while Boeing’s team could claim just 5,000.
LABOR
Globalization has impacted labor, too. Highlyskilled workers are sought by technology and other
high-value-added firms, especially those in the defense
sector. In many cases, globalization has made these
workers more mobile than ever before, and in those
cases where mobility is restricted, companies have
come to them.
There is considerable debate over the extent to
which the United States is experiencing a skills gap.
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According to the National Science Foundation, more
than 40 percent of scientific and engineering talent
will leave the U.S. workforce in the next decade or
so.91 More then 50 percent of U.S. computer scientists
and nearly a quarter of its science and engineering
workforce are from abroad. Entrepreneurs from China
and India accounted for almost one-third of high-tech
start-ups in Silicon Valley in the 1990s. Currently more
than half the graduate students in engineering in the
United States are foreign born.92 Half of China’s college
graduate earn degrees in engineering, compared with
only 5 percent in the United States. South Korea, with
one-sixth the population of the United States, graduates
about the same number of engineers as U.S. universities
do.93 Results from the 2003 Trends in International
Mathematics and Science Study showed U.S. fourthgraders were outperformed by only three countries
(Taiwan, Japan, and Singapore) in both math and
science, but that eighth-graders were outperformed in
both fields by seven countries (Chinese Taipei, Japan,
Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Estonia, and
Hungary).94 U.S. eight-graders ranked 15th (out of 45
countries) in math and tied for ninth in science. There
seems to be no shortage of reports that the United
States is falling behind in its ability to educate and train
its own citizens for the high-tech workplace of the 21st
century. Part of the explanation behind the “falling
behind” scenario is that developing countries have
devoted large amounts of resources in recent years to
bring up the average education level of their citizens,
so U.S. students have not so much been doing more
poorly than previous generations of U.S. students, but
students in other countries are catching up quickly
to U.S. levels. But the consequence of this shift is that
workers in other countries will soon become as skilled
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and trained as U.S. workers, thereby reducing labor
advantages that the United States has long held.
On the other hand, other studies suggest that
the skills shortage may be less severe. For example,
in proportion to its population, the United States
conferred 55 percent more computer science,
information technology (IT), and engineering degrees
than China, and almost four times more than India.95
A survey by the consultancy McKinsey revealed that
the pool of Chinese engineers suitable to work for
multinationals is about 160,000, less than one-third of
the graduates.96 Similarly, while three million students
graduate from Indian universities each year, only
about 25 percent of engineering graduates and 10-15
percent of general college graduates are considered
suitable for direct employment in the offshore IT and
business process outsourcing industries, according to
a study by India’s National Association of Software
and Service Companies. The consequence of such
shortages is that highly skilled workers, particularly
in engineering and the sciences, are in high demand
everywhere—the United States, Europe, China, and
India. The competition among companies to hire and
retain such workers is likely to be fierce in the short to
medium term.
Regardless of where the United States stands in
its ability to generate a highly skilled workforce, it is
clear that such talent is in high demand throughout the
world. Other developed countries, such as Australia and
Canada, have become aggressive acquirers of talented
immigrants and students. Developing countries,
including Taiwan, Korea, India, and China are trying
to retain talented workers and lure expatriates back
home by increasing investments in science and offering
better pay and opportunities.97 However, in the United
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States and most European countries, there has been a
backlash against immigration in recent years. Indeed,
the “immigration debate” almost certainly has been
the most discussed domestic policy issue in the United
States in 2006.
According to the National Science Board, onefourth of all college-educated workers in science and
engineering occupations in 2003 were foreign born.98
This figure rises to 40 percent for doctorate degree holders in these occupations, and even higher in some fields
like computer science (57 percent), electrical engineering
(57 percent), and mechanical engineering (52 percent).
Despite these high numbers, it often is difficult for U.S.
firms to hire foreign workers in engineering and the
sciences, given the procedures implemented since the
9/11 attacks. Hiring foreign workers, including those
attending U.S. universities, is important particularly
to technology-oriented firms, since numerous studies
show serious math and science deficiencies among
native-born U.S. students. Craig Barrett, chairman of
Intel, argues that it is increasingly difficult to get foreign
students into our universities because of security
concerns and improved education options in their own
countries.99 Those foreign students who are allowed
into the United States and complete their studies are
returning home in ever greater numbers because of
visa issues or better employment opportunities. The
H1-B visa program, which provides a process for
granting admission or permanent residency to foreign
engineers and scientists, currently is capped at 65,000
people per year and is oversubscribed. Intel’s Barrett,
among other technology leaders including Microsoft’s
Bill Gates, have criticized the restrictions on foreign
workers, including a cap of 140,000 on the number of
green cards that allow permanent employment, and
long processing delays meaning waits up to 7 years.100
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The defense industry is insulated partly from
some of these problems. Many high-tech companies,
if faced with a lack of engineering and science workers
in the United States, can simply go to those locations
where such workers are more abundant. But given the
national security concerns associated with the defense
sector, it is more difficult (although not impossible)
to move research and development (R&D) abroad. In
any case, if there is a limited talent pool within U.S.
borders, defense industry firms at the least will be
forced to allocate greater resources to attract and retain
such workers.
Yet statistics show that where and how R&D
funds are spent can be a critical source of economic
competitiveness. According to the National Science
Foundation (NSF), federally funded R&D totaled $127.6
billion in 2006, of which $74.8 billion, or 58.6 percent,
was allocated for national defense (including DoD’s
military activities, Department of Energy’s [DoE]
atomic energy defense programs, and defense-related
R&D of Department of Homeland Security [DHS]).101
In its most recent projections, the NSF expected total
R&D in the United States to amount to $312.1 billion
in 2004, with $199.0 billion coming from industry,
$93.4 billion from the federal government, $11.1 billion
from colleges and universities, and $8.6 billion from
other nonprofit institutions.102 R&D expenditures as
a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) have
ranged between 2.5-2.7 percent annually over the past
decade. As a percentage of GDP over the period 200003, the United States ranks sixth (behind Israel, Sweden,
Finland, Japan, and Iceland) and slightly ahead of South
Korea, Switzerland, Denmark, and Germany. The
increasing economic influence of Asia is evident in R&D
spending. According to a United Nations Education,
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Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
2005 report, Asia’s share of global research spending
rose from 27.9 percent in 1997 to 31.5 percent in 2002,
the most recent year for which reliable figures were
available.103 Over the same period, Europe’s share fell
from 28.8 percent to 27.3 percent, and North America’s
from 38.2 percent to 37.0 percent. Finally, according to
the European Defense Agency, participating member
countries (all 25 EU members except Denmark) are
expected to spend €2.3 billion on defense research and
technology in 2006—about 1.3 percent of total defense
expenditure.104
While the international comparisons are favorable
toward the United States, one important element is
where the R&D funds are being spent. Increasingly,
U.S. dollars are being spent overseas in centers in China
and India, according to an annual report by the Battelle
Memorial Institute and R&D Magazine.105 While U.S.
companies can deduct expenses for R&D to reduce their
U.S. tax obligations, actual research and development
can take place anywhere in the world. Thus, companies
can deduct expenses for R&D undertaken at overseas
offices and laboratories. IBM opened an “innovation
center” in China during 2004 that will double the size
of its existing IBM China Research Lab, and about
one-third of Microsoft’s 700-person research division
are located outside the United States. Data on the
offshoring of R&D is anecdotal at this point, since data
are not available on how much R&D U.S. companies
are conducting abroad. For companies in the defense
industry, this trend is a potential problem since they
will be under competitive pressure to utilize foreign
research knowledge but will face significant restrictions
by DoD.
To the extent that national economic competitiveness in general, and a thriving defense industry in
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particular, is built upon a well-educated and skilled
workforce, governments and companies will need to
devise policies that ensure they have among the best
pool of talent in the world. While the international
mobility of workers has yet to catch up to the mobility
of companies, globalization gradually is leveling this
playing field.
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
Finally, efforts to regulate, control, or deal with
globalization (often referred to as “global governance”)
provide opportunities for policymakers to try to
harness globalization in ways that will support
national interests. Governance can take such forms as
the creation of international organizations, developing
public-private partnerships, industry self-regulation, or
involving a variety of stakeholders in policy formulation
and implementation. Governance approaches taken by
the United States either generally or on an adhoc basis
will have implications for the defense industrial base
since the actions of these companies will be bound
by such decisions. Of course, globalization affects the
defense industrial base of all countries, and some will
benefit from these changes while others will not. How
other countries’ defense industries change in response
to globalization will, in turn, affect the U.S. defense
industrial base.
One of the more contentious post Cold War issues is
the role of international organizations.106 Globalization
has given rise to the need to address problems that
are beyond the competences of individual nationstates. International organizations such as the WTO,
UN, and the EU have filled part of the governing gap
with respect to trade, finance, environment, and other
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issues. At the same time, these organizations have been
criticized for being unaccountable, undemocratic, and
exclusive, and for undermining national sovereignty.
These issues came to a head for two international
organizations that have been involved in two major
events in the recent history of Airbus and Boeing.
The first instance was in 1997, when the EU’s
competition authorities vetted the Boeing-McDonnell
Douglas merger.107 Although U.S. authorities had
approved the merger, the EU ruled that the merger
would hurt competition in the EU and demanded
that Boeing make three changes to the terms of the
merger. Boeing at first argued that the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission, not the EU, should take the lead in
investigating the deal. When the EU went ahead with
the investigation, Boeing made minor concessions.
When an EU merger panel voted unanimously that
the EU block the merger, Boeing made last-minute
concessions to satisfy EU concerns.
The incident was significant for several reasons.
First, while the EU had a modest influence in setting
conditions on prior mergers between two U.S.
companies, this was by far the most aggressive stand
that the EU had taken in such matters. Second, political
leaders ranging from President Bill Clinton and Vice
President Al Gore to France’s President Jacques Chirac
strongly advocated the position of their respective
companies and regulatory authorities. Third, the
EU’s position was seen widely in the United States as
an attempt to protect Airbus. Similar concerns were
raised in 2001 when the EU blocked General Electric’s
proposed merger with Honeywell. Rightly or not,
any EU policy decision, particularly in the realm of
competition policy that affects aerospace, will be
viewed in the United States as an industrial policy
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aimed at supporting Airbus. But the larger point is that
the deepening of integration in Europe over the past
20 years has transferred more regulatory powers from
national authorities to the EU, and companies around
the world need to be aware of how such institutional
changes can affect their business.
Over the past 2 years, governments in the United
States and Europe have raised the stakes by bringing
their dispute over subsidies for Airbus and Boeing
to the WTO. In May 2005, the U.S. Government
announced that it would challenge European
government subsidies to Airbus within the WTO. The
next day, the EU filed a similar charge against U.S.
Government aid to Boeing. The event that precipitated
the U.S. Government action was an Airbus request for
aid to support the development of a new aircraft—the
A350—that is aimed to compete with Boeing’s 787
Dreamliner. However, U.S. and European officials were
headed for such a showdown for years.
The United States long has accused European
governments of providing subsidies, specifically loan
guarantees, to Airbus. The main objection by U.S.
officials is “launch aid” that is provided by European
governments to Airbus. Launch aid is money given
to Airbus partners to develop new plane models. The
money is repayable once planes are sold to airlines.
But this delay can be several years, and include
development, testing, and actual manufacturing.
According to one estimate,108 European governments
have spent $25 billion on Airbus since 1970, while
Boeing’s former president and chief executive officer
Harry Stonecipher contends that European launch aid
to Airbus over the years has allowed the company to
avoid $35 billion of debt it would have occurred by
borrowing money commercially.109 The U.S. position
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is that launch aid reduces risk for Airbus since,
presumably, the model it supports could prove to
be a failure once it comes to market. Airbus would
be unable to repay the aid and, the complaint goes,
European governments would be pressed to forgive
the loan. The A380 superjumbo benefits from a loan
of $3.7 billion, which will not have to be repaid should
Airbus fail to sell more than 500 of these planes.110
However, Airbus, European governments, and the
EU respond that Airbus has repaid previous loans.
The United States contends that this kind of support
contravenes WTO rules forbidding direct government
subsidies of specific companies or industries. The
U.S. House of Representatives went so far as to pass
a bill in December 2005 banning the Pentagon from
buying any equipment from a company involved in a
subsidies dispute with the United States in the WTO.111
The provision later was dropped during House-Senate
negotiations, but it illustrates the animosity that many
U.S. political leaders hold toward Europe, and the
protective measures some will take to ensure that
the Pentagon “buys American.” (Airbus is hoping to
win a contract to supply the U.S. Air Force with in-air
refueling tankers.)
A 1992 agreement limited the amount of aid that
both sides could provide to their respective aerospace
company. For Airbus, aid would be limited to onethird of development costs, while Boeing’s support
from the U.S. Government would be limited to 4
percent of sales. This agreement began to unravel once
Airbus approached Boeing’s market share, and the
European company’s success over the past few years
persuaded U.S. officials to abandon the 1992 agreement
and negotiate with the EU to phase out launch aid for
Airbus. When these talks produced no results, in part
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because the Europeans demanded that a subsidy paid
by the Japanese government to a consortium making
wings for Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner be included in
the negotiations, the United States took “the nuclear
option” by bringing the dispute to the WTO.112 A
resolution within the WTO may very well find both
sides at fault and lead to an outcome that is far less
satisfying than bilateral negotiations could produce.
That, in effect, is what happened when Brazil’s Embraer
and Canada’s Bombardier went to the WTO in 1996 to
dispute claims of government support for each regional
jetliner manufacturer. The organization ruled that both
governments violated international trade rules. Each
country threatened to implement more than $3 billion
in retaliation, however neither has acted.
In their response, the EU claims that Boeing benefits
from the spillover effects of contracts obtained from the
Pentagon and National Air and Space Administration.
As a result, Boeing’s R&D subsidies are worth $23
billion in the past 13 years.113 The EU also argues that
U.S. state and local governments provide aid to Boeing
in the form of tax breaks and other indirect support.
For example, in 2001 when Boeing reviewed locations
to move its corporate headquarters, Dallas offered
millions of dollars of tax breaks and other incentives, and
Denver offered $13-18 million. But both ultimately lost
to Chicago’s package of $41 million of state incentives
over 20 years. While incentives were not the only factor
in Boeing’s decision, their impact was not negligible
and strengthens the EU’s case.114 Washington state, the
home of Boeing before the company moved to Chicago
and still the home of much of its manufacturing, has
provided significant support over the years, and Kansas
provided aid for the 787 Dreamliner. In all, Boeing is
expecting to receive about $6 billion in government
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launch aid for the 787, including a $3.2 billion tax
reduction for production in Washington state and
support from the Japanese and Italian governments for
wing and fuselage production.115
While the crux of the U.S. argument is that Airbus
received launch aid that helped it to develop new planes
while Boeing did not, it is not necessarily the case that
this put the U.S. company at a disadvantage. As one
observer notes, “[a]t no point in the past decade was
Boeing unable to fund new aircraft. Its balance sheet
was strong. It simply chose not to spend its cash on
jetliner development, giving Airbus a strong product
advantage.”116 Boeing’s commercial R&D spending
did not increase after the 777 jetliner development
ended in the mid-1990s. Thus, the EU could argue that
Boeing’s misfortunes were self-inflicted due to shortsightedness with regard to changes in the market and
customer preferences.
The decision by the United States and EU to
take the aerospace subsidies dispute to the WTO
underscores the inability of officials on both sides to
resolve a growing number of trade disputes. The other
major transatlantic trade dispute involves U.S. use of
subsidies for exporters, with Boeing (which receives
about $200 million annually from this program,
according to the EU) being one of the two top recipients
of this program. The WTO determined in 2002 that this
Foreign Sales Corporation and Extraterritorial Income
(FSC-ETI) tax system violated international trade rules,
and authorized the EU to impose penalties on U.S.
exports totaling $4 billion.117 Under pressure from U.S.
companies who were penalized when the EU began
imposing WTO-approved tariffs in March 2004 starting
at 5 percent and increasing by 1 percent monthly, the
U.S. Congress revised the FSC-ETI system in October
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2004, but instituted a range of other tax breaks totaling
$137 billion in its place.118 The EU again complained
to the WTO, which ruled that the new tax breaks were
also in violation of trade laws. Reports that the EU was
considering leaving some portion of the sanctions in
place and targeting the penalties directly at European
imports of Boeing aircraft to punish the company
for backing the WTO complaint against subsidies to
Airbus (a complaint initiated by the United States in
October 2004) drew a sharp rebuke from U.S. trade
representative Robert Zoellick for linking the two
issues.119
Not surprisingly, the WTO is a lightning rod for
a range of critics, from economic protectionists to
environmentalists and labor activists, and opponents of
globalization. Drawing aerospace into this whirlpool of
criticism certainly is not helping to improve transatlantic relations or support in the United States and EU
for international organizations. However, the WTO is
perhaps the symbol that best represents globalization
and its corresponding processes, and its objective of
reducing trade barriers provides the organization with
support from countries and companies that benefit
most from these principles.
Global governance also encompasses issues
requiring international cooperation through lessinstitutionalized forums than the WTO. This is
particularly true when defense industrial issues are
part of a wider international economic relationship.120
For example, the EU imposed an arms embargo on
China after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. But
by late 2004, Beijing was placing heavy pressure on
European governments to lift the embargo, arguing
that China has changed since 1989 and should not
be lumped with other pariah countries like Burma,
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Sudan, or Zimbabwe. Chinese officials even suggested
that Sino-European trade could be affected adversely if
the embargo was not lifted. In 2005, the EU accounted
for 16.4 percent of China’s total foreign merchandise
trade—ahead of both the United States (16.0 percent)
and Japan (13.9 percent).121 European companies have
been very successful in China: Volkswagen makes the
country’s most popular brand of cars, and Siemens
is the biggest foreign employer in China. And, given
the growth of China’s economy, Airbus hopes to
sell billions of euros worth of aircraft over the next
couple of decades. At the same time, U.S. Government
officials contend that, should the embargo be lifted, the
United States would erect firewalls when considering
defense sales to Europe, and would take into account
whether a European company wanting sophisticated
U.S. technology had any links with China.122 Although
the EU member countries could not reach agreement
in December 2004 on lifting the ban, intense lobbying
pressure from European companies in almost all
sectors, including defense, and the national leaders
who benefit from the success of home-grown companies
that gain from an economic relationship with China,
will keep this issue alive in the coming months.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Globalization, in many ways, has strengthened the
hand of defense companies at the expense of national
governments. With more opportunities to expand their
international presence, governments, at times, are
being required to make concessions that would have
been unheard of even a decade ago. With the Pentagon
and ministries of defense in a monopsonist position
(i.e., being the only buyer), defense firms, which were
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very much oriented around a national production and
finance base, depended on receipt of weapons contracts
from their home governments, often in the face of
intense competition with other firms in the industry.
Of course, international arms sales were present and
often vital for a company’s success, but exports almost
always were secondary, since they were a way to
increase production runs, capitalize on learning from
manufacturing processes for the home market, and
lower overall per-unit costs.
But today many companies are looking at foreign
markets much sooner—or even instead of home markets. BAE is perhaps the best example of this. With probably the most open defense procurement markets in the
world, the UK often has awarded contracts to foreign
companies instead of its own national champion—
BAE. According to a December 2005 White Paper, the
UK Ministry of Defense placed 5 percent of its 2004-05
spending on imports, 14 percent with foreign-owned
UK-based companies, and 13 percent on cooperative
European programs.123 In contrast, the United States
spent less than 2 percent on imports and 7 percent
with foreign-owned companies. With BAE generating
an increasing percentage of its sales abroad and even
considering moving its corporate headquarters to the
United States, the British government revised its policy
in early 2006. The Ministry of Defense now promises to
make BAE the government’s partner of choice for air,
land, and sea weapons procurements.124 The new more
cooperative relationship ensures the preservation
of an indigenous defense industrial base, a serious
government concern, and provides BAE with an
understanding that more contracts with the Ministry
of Defense will be forthcoming.
Nigel Whitehead, head of BAE’s fighter jet business,
probably sums up the views of many defense industry
64

executives—U.S. and foreign—when he says, “The
sentimental engineer in me wants to be in the UK.
But if you look at the cold reality of corporations, we
have to determine the best markets in which to invest
shareholders’ money.”125 The increasing difficulty
of reconciling national loyalties and international
business opportunities has been the main point of this
monograph.
Given the effects that globalization has had on
national industrial bases around the world, the
following recommendations should be considered as
appropriate means to enhance U.S. national security.
However, given the scope of globalization and the
multiple actors and dimensions that underpin it, it is
beyond the ability of the U.S. Army or even DoD to
shape its direction, even as globalization relates to the
U.S. defense industrial base. The recommendations
should be viewed, then, as multilayered, with different
roles for the private sector and the various branches,
departments, and agencies of the federal government
(indicated in parentheses).
1. Monitor international production patterns
of leading U.S. defense industrial companies
(DoD). While it is fairly clear why defense firms are
internationalizing their production base, especially
those dependent to a greater degree on revenues from
civilian products, there is serious reason for concern
that the flow of critical technologies to Japan, China,
and other current and potential powers could have
adverse consequences for U.S. national and economic
security in the medium to long term. DoD officials
should consider stipulating that the 30 largest defense
contractors must submit an annual report describing
the extent of their international production and R&D,
including their leading suppliers. The information
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would give defense officials an understanding of the
extent to which offshore sites are involved in critical
technologies and production. The proposal is not meant
to discourage the internationalization of companies,
but simply to give the Department information that
will allow it to determine whether, collectively, the
global activities of the U.S. defense industrial base are
a national security concern.
2. Make the approval process for foreign
acquisitions more transparent (Executive and
Legislative branches). In the wake of the CNOOC and
especially Dubai Ports World controversies, it is clear
that a more transparent process should be devised
to determine whether acquisitions of U.S. companies
pose a risk to national security. The CFIUS, currently
comprised of mid-level, department-protecting
government officials, should consist of higher-ranking
(even cabinet level) officials and perhaps independent
experts and even representatives from each chamber
of Congress. Particular attention should be given to
deals in which foreign companies are owned entirely
or substantially by their governments.
3. Take a proactive stance in terms of investment
in the United States by foreign defense companies
(DoD). It is in the best interest of the military and
DoD to have greater procurement options. Given
appropriate safeguards with respect to technology
transfer, there is little downside to purchasing weapons
from U.S. affiliates of foreign companies. When there
is opposition to inward investment from Congress, the
media, or industry, the Pentagon and relevant military
branches should take a proactive stance to influence
decisionmakers and opinion-formers through formal
and informal channels of communication.
4. Give preference to foreign companies with U.S.based production when awarding contracts (DoD).
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Foreign defense companies should not be penalized in
the arms procurement process if they have a substantial
investment in the United States. Foreign firms with
high levels of U.S.-based production and employment
(including high-skill jobs) should be given preference
over other foreign bidders, and even U.S. firms that
may be planning to do significant amount of the work
offshore. If DoD’s objective is to ensure the stability of
the U.S. defense industrial base, the focus should be
on how much of a contract’s work (including R&D
production) will be conducted within the United
States. Given that workers will remain less mobile than
companies for the foreseeable future, employment of
U.S. workers—rather than the nationality of bidding
firms—should be given higher priority.
5. Be judicious in restricting technology transfer
(DoD). While there clearly is concern that globalization
is facilitating the transfer of sophisticated technology
to potential adversaries, the U.S. Government needs
to be more judicious in exercising controls. Most of
the partners in the JSF program are reliable allies, and
strained diplomatic relations over this issue are not
worth the marginal benefit of restricting the transfer of
computer codes and other technologies related to this
aircraft. The assumption that the United States always
will be on the leading edge of technology is false. As
the increasing competitiveness of other countries is
making clear, it is very likely that a greater number of
innovative technologies with military applications will
come from abroad. It is important, then, that DoD and
other government bodies seeking to control technology
transfer realize that globalization is making this process
a “two-way street.”
6. Diversify into nondefense sectors (Defense
companies). U.S. defense spending has grown an
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average of 9-10 percent in each of the past 5 years.
Even with the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
and the challenges of global terrorism, spending is
expected to fall to 3-4 percent annually, below the level
of inflation in military equipment costs. Jim Albaugh,
head of Boeing’s defense business, argues that “too
many capabilities are chasing too few dollars,” and that
expensive programs will be cut back, underperforming
projects cancelled, and new weapons development
suspended.126 Lockheed plans to build its information
technology business, which it hopes eventually will
account for two-thirds of revenues. This includes
not only battlefield systems, but IT services to the
government and even the healthcare market. Thus,
firms should avoid over-investing in the defense side of
their business. This will result in two advantages. First,
it should allow companies to maintain strong balance
sheets, which will allow them to take advantage of
opportunities at home and abroad (including crossborder acquisitions). Second, it will help in technology
transfer, since many of the more innovative technologies
today originate in civilian-oriented business activities.
7. Improve math and science education (Federal,
state, and local government). In terms of skills, more
needs to be done to improve the U.S. educational
environment, particularly in math and science at all
levels. The Congress-authorized National Academies
Committee recommended that the government create
25,000 undergraduate and 5,000 graduate scholarships
in the amount of $25,000 in technical fields, especially
those determined to be in areas of urgent “national
need.”127 The Committee also recommended a tax
credit for employers who make continuing education
available for scientists and engineers, and a sustained
national commitment to basic research. Building a

68

skilled indigenous workforce is essential not only
for national security, but for national economic
competitiveness as well.
8. Rebalance security concerns with economic
competitiveness in areas of scientific research
(Federal government and universities). In the current
environment, there is reasonable justification to evaluate
fully the backgrounds of foreign students, scholars, and
researchers who attend or work at U.S. universities.
But there seems little to be gained by burdening
universities with additional layers of administration
in this area. In July 2005, DoD proposed new security
restrictions on access by foreign researchers to sensitive
technology useful to national security, including
segregated university laboratories. The Department
of Commerce created a committee to study this issue
in May 2006. After intense pressure from universities,
both departments backed off their proposals, with
DoD agreeing that its original version was “overly
prescriptive.”128 Since foreign researchers and students
had to go through a visa approval process to come to
the United States in the first place, it is not clear that
a second vetting process is necessary to determine
whether they are a risk in sensitive research. Since
globalization shortens the lead time that companies
have to develop innovative ideas and products, it is
critical that the United States remain a leader in cutting
edge technologies.
9. Ease restrictions on foreign high-skilled workers
(Federal government and defense companies). The
process whereby foreigners obtain permission to work
in the United States needs to be revamped. While it
is important to give appropriate weight to security
concerns, the economic argument that highly-trained
foreign workers can spur economic growth generally,
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and innovations in high-technology (including the
defense sector) in particular, must be given greater
attention. The number of permanent visas for highly
educated foreigners should be increased, as should the
visas that permit foreign students to matriculate at U.S.
colleges and universities. The U.S. higher education
system is envied by many around the world, and
should be used as a recruiting tool to attract capable
foreigners. From an economic and national security
standpoint, it makes little sense to instill knowledge
into foreign students, and then send them to their
home countries to take up jobs where they compete
with workers born in the United States.
10. Work with global institutions to harness
the benefits of globalization (Various federal
departments and agencies and defense companies).
The EU and WTO are, along with the UN, the most
complex, sophisticated, and high-profile organizations
in the world. Conflict between these organizations
and the nation-states that have yielded sovereignty
and decisionmaking to them is certain to occur. As
discussed earlier, the merger approval powers of the
EU and the WTO’s rules regarding aerospace and
export subsidies have sparked skepticism about the
motivations and usefulness of these international
organizations. It is important to keep in mind that
these organizations have benefited U.S. interests more
than they have harmed them. EU authorities approve
the vast majority of M&As between U.S. companies
or U.S.-European ones. Since the mid-1990s, antitrust
regulators in Washington and Brussels have worked
closely, exchanged information, and strived to reach
similar decisions. U.S. companies, including those
in the defense industry, benefit from a European
organization that is seeking to harmonize the business
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environment across its 25 member countries. Likewise,
U.S. firms benefit from the market-opening principles
of the WTO, even if, as appears increasingly likely,
the Boeing-Airbus subsidy controversy results in both
sides being unhappy with the trade body’s decision.
U.S. officials should continue to support and influence
the direction of these organizations, rather than pursue
a unilateral agenda in transatlantic and international
trade and economic matters.
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